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Not the Plainest Meaning: The Statute of Limitations 





The Public Records Act (PRA) gives Washington state citizens 
the right to request a copy of government documents.
1
 Like similar 
laws in every other state,
2
 the purpose of the law is to hold the 
government accountable by keeping the public informed.
3
 Once a 
request for documents is made, the PRA provides individuals the 
right to seek judicial review and a possible award of monetary 
damages if he or she feels the government has given an inadequate 
response.
4
 But the right to a judicial remedy carries with it an 
important question: how long can an individual wait to file suit?  
 
 
 J.D. Candidate (2015), Washington University in St. Louis School of Law; M.Sc. 
(2011), Trinity College Dublin; B.A. (2010), The Evergreen State College. Thank you to my 
sister, parents, and the rest of my friends and family for all of your support throughout the 
writing process.   
 1. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030, § 42.56.070 (2007).  
 2. See RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy in A Post-
Newspaper America, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557, 580–81 (2011) (discussing the creation of 
open records laws “in every state in the nation”).  
 3. See id. at 590 (noting that newspapers’ efforts to ensure “public access to government 
affairs” through the passage of open-records laws made them akin to “bulwarks of public 
accountability”). The idea that open government could be a check on corruption is probably 
best seen in Justice Brandeis’ famous remark that “sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants.” LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 
92 (Norman Hapgood ed., BiblioLife, LLC 2009) (1914). The PRA was established on this 
premise, as its stated aim was for the public to “maintain control” over public officials. 
§ 42.56.030.  
 4. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.550 (2011). Damages from PRA litigation often impose 
tremendous burdens on government agencies, which face already limited budgetary constraints. 
See William D. Richard, Procedural Rules Under Washington's Public Records Act: The Case 
for Agency Discretion, 85 WASH. L. REV. 493, 515 (2010) (noting that the PRA has led to 
courts imposing “large monetary judgments which . . . burden already limited public resources 
and, ultimately, the taxpayers whose interests the PRA is meant to protect.”). This problem is 
especially acute for the Washington State Department of Corrections. In 2007 alone, 
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The PRA allows individuals to request documents and public 
records
5
 from all public agencies in the state,
6
 including even county-
level government offices. The PRA specifies that its provisions must 
be strictly construed against the government
7
 in order to encourage 
maximum disclosure.
8
 In interpreting the PRA, the Washington 
Supreme Court has found that courts must “look at the Act in its 
entirety in order to enforce the law’s overall purpose.”9 The PRA is a 
strict liability statute, meaning that the government agency’s intent is 
irrelevant.
10
 Government agencies must publish their procedures for 
 
Department staff responded to almost 5,000 public records requests from incarcerated felons, at 
a cost of more than $250,000 and 12,000 hours of staff time. Rachel La Corte, Felons don't 
have rights to public records, Attorney General says, SEATTLE TIMES, June 10, 2008, 
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2004468035_records10m.html. See also H. B. Rep. SSB 
5130, 1st Sess. (Mar. 17, 2009) (testimony in support of the bill noting that “incarcerated felons 
have been flooding state and local governments with requests intended to overburden the public 
records staff, and harass law enforcement and other public employees”). For this reason, the 
interpretation of the PRA’s statute of limitations has a very real impact on government and 
public policy.  
 5. The PRA’s definition of “public record” is very expansive. It includes “any writing 
containing information relating to the conduct of government or the performance of any 
governmental or proprietary function prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local 
agency regardless of physical form or characteristics.” WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010 (2012). 
However, agencies do not have the duty to create a document if it does not exist. See, e.g., Sperr 
v. City of Spokane, 123 Wash. App. 132, 136–37 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) and Bldg. Indus. Ass'n 
of Washington v. McCarthy, 152 Wash. App. 720, 740 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). Washington 
State also has an open meetings law, which is located in a separate chapter of the Annotated 
Code. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30 (2006) (Open Public Meetings Act).  
 6. The PRA defines “agency” as inclusive of “all state agencies and all local agencies.” 
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010. Almost every conceivable state and local agency is included: 
“‘State agency’ includes every state office, department, division, bureau, board, commission, or 
other state agency. ‘Local agency’ includes every county, city, town, municipal corporation, 
quasi-municipal corporation, or special purpose district, or any office, department, division, 
bureau, board, commission, or agency thereof, or other local public agency.” Id.  
 7. “This chapter shall be liberally construed and its exemptions narrowly construed. . . .” 
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030.  
 8. The unequivocal goal of the PRA is to encourage maximum disclosure. “The people 
insist on remaining informed so that they may maintain control over the instruments that they 
have created.” WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030. The PRA also specifies that in the event of a 
conflict between the PRA and any other chapter of the Washington Code, the PRA would 
prevail. Id.  
 9. Rental Hous. Ass'n of Puget Sound v. City of Des Moines, 199 P.3d 393, 398 (Wash. 
2009).  
 10. Courts have noted the general rule that acting in good faith is no excuse for a violation 
of the PRA. See, e.g., Yousoufian v. Office of Ron Sims, 229 P.3d 735, 744 (Wash. 2010) (“an 
agency’s good faith reliance on an exemption does not insulate the agency from a penalty”). 
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making documents available for inspection and copying,
11
 and upon 
receipt of any public records request the agency has exactly five 
business days to respond.
12
 Although it is allowed to request both 
more time and further clarification from the requestor,
13
 in its 
response the agency must either release the documents
14
 or claim an 
exemption.
15
 The PRA specifies a limited number of exemptions,
16
 
and the agency must provide a clearly stated explanation when 
rendering their decision.
17
 Agencies are permitted to provide the 
requested documents in multiple installments,
18
 if necessary. This 
gives rise to the ambiguity found in the PRA’s statute of limitations.  
If the requestor is unsatisfied with the agency’s response and 
decides to take his grievance to court, he must do so within the 
PRA’s statute of limitations.19 All actions “must be filed within one 
 
amount of the penalty. Id. The exception to this rule is lawsuits brought by incarcerated felons-
the PRA specifies that no penalties can be awarded in such cases unless the court finds that the 
agency acted in bad faith. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.565 (2011).  
 11. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.040 (2012).  
 12. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.520 (2010). However, the government agency does not 
have to provide its final response within those five days. Rather, the government is allowed to 
state a “reasonable estimate” of the time needed to identify and assemble the requested 
documents. Id. The government agency is also allowed to deny the public records request, but it 
must specify the reason (such as having no responsive records or claiming an exemption). Id.  
 13. See id. The agency is allowed to respond by asking for clarification as to which 
documents or information is being sought. Id. 
 14. In cases where records are produced, the government agency is allowed to charge 
copying fees for the requested documents. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.120 (2006).  
 15. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.080 (2006).  
 16. The PRA includes a number of very specific exemptions. For example, personal 
information, such as public school student records and credit card information, is exempt from 
disclosure, and agencies can withhold those portions of documents, even if requested. WASH. 
REV. CODE § 42.56.230 (2013). These exemptions have grown in number over time. See WASH. 
FINAL B. REP., H.B. 1133, LEG. 59, 1ST REG. SESS., 2005 REGULAR SESSION, HOUSE BILL 1133, 
Leg. 59, 1st Sess. (2005) (noting that “[a]t the time the initiative was passed, there were 10 
exemptions from public records disclosure”). 
 17. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.210(3) (2006). The Supreme Court of Washington 
interpreted this language as mandating government agencies to provide a “brief explanation” of 
the stated exemption. Sanders v. State, 240 P.3d 120, 131 (Wash. 2010). The explanation 
cannot be a generic, form response; instead it must apply to the particular request to which it 
responds. Id.  
 18. Agencies are allowed to provide the requested documents on “a partial or installment 
basis as records that are part of a larger set of requested records are assembled or made ready 
for inspection or disclosure.” WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.080. This language mirrors the statute 
of limitations, which similarly mentions “partial or installment basis.” WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 42.56.550(6). 
 19. Id.  
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year of the agency’s claim of exemption or the last production of a 
record on a partial or installment basis.”20 Although Washington 
State’s Annotated Code includes a two-year “catch-all” statute of 
limitations for actions not addressed elsewhere,
21
 the PRA’s language 
leaves at least one question unanswered: what limitations period 
applies when an agency produces all requested documents in a single 
installment?  
The Washington State Courts of Appeals have reached conflicting 
answers to this question. In Tobin v. Worden,
22
 Division 1 took a 
narrow, literalist approach, holding that the PRA’s statute of 
limitations did not apply to cases where the agency had provided all 
documents in a single installment.
23
 Division 2 later disagreed, 
finding that the statute did indeed apply to cases in which the 
government agency produced all of the records at one time.
24
 As the 
Washington State Supreme Court has thus far failed to resolve the 
issue, the Courts of Appeals remain divided.
25
  
This Note argues that the PRA’s statute of limitations should 
apply to cases in which a government agency provides all requested 
documents in a single installment.
26
 Part II will discuss the history of 
the statute of limitations, including historical amendments and the 
varying judicial interpretations by both the Washington State 
Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals. This history provides the 
background for the analysis in Part III, which examines the 
 
 20. Id. As the statutory language makes abundantly clear, the limitations period does not 
commence when the initial request is made, but instead when an exemption is stated or the “last 
production of a record.” See id. 
 21. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.130 (2013) provides a two-year catch-all statute of 
limitations. “An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for, shall be commenced within two 
years after the cause of action shall have accrued.” Id. This statute raises the possibility that 
single installment cases might be barred after the expiration of the two-year period, even if 
section 42.56.550(6) is inapplicable.  
 22. Tobin v. Worden, 233 P.3d 906, 909 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). 
 23. Id. Tobin did not mention the possibility of § 4.16.130’s two-year statute. Id.  
 24. Bartz v. State Dep't of Corr. Pub. Disclosure Unit, 297 P.3d 737, 744 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2013), cert. denied, 309 P.3d 504 (Wash. 2013).  
 25. The Washington State Supreme Court denied the petition for review in Bartz. Id.  
 26. Although many of the arguments made in this Note could apply equally to cases in 
which no documents were provided, that is not the principal focus here. Similarly, this Note 
will mention, but not focus on, the possible applicability of the two-year catch-all statute of 
limitations. Tobin did not address this question, and its largest disagreement with Bartz is the 
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weaknesses in the state of the law today. Part IV will argue that a 
broader interpretation is reasonable and moreover, consistent with the 
legislature’s intent and the goals of the PRA.  
THE HISTORY OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
In the election of 1972, Washington State voters passed Initiative 
276, which mandated public access to government records.
27
 Once 
enacted, the law became known as the Public Disclosure Act.
28
 It 
contained a relatively simple five-year
29
 statute of limitations: “[a]ny 
action brought under the provisions of this chapter must be 
commenced within five years after the date when the violation 
occurred.”30  
The legislature made significant changes to the Public Disclosure 
Act through two amendments in 2005. These began with the Act’s 
reorganization into the PRA.
31
 At the same time, the legislature 
debated, amended, and later passed House Bill 1758,
32
 which 
incorporated a number of substantive alterations.
33
 These included a 
 
 27. WASHINGTON HOUSE BILL REPORT, 2005 REGULAR SESSION, HOUSE BILL 1133, H. 
59, 1st Sess. (Feb. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Report for House Bill 1133]. 
 28. See id.  
 29. The Public Disclosure Act originally included a six-year statute of limitations. WASH. 
REV. CODE § 42.17.410 (1974) (current version at WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.550). This 
eventually was shortened to five years, the length of the limitations period that existed prior to 
recodification into the PRA. See infra note 34.  
 30. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.410 (2004) (current version at WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 42.56.550).  
 31. Report for House Bill 1133. See also WASHINGTON BILL HISTORY, 2005 REGULAR 
SESSION, HOUSE BILL 1133, Leg. 59, 1st Sess. (May 4, 2005). The bill passed without a single 
nay vote in either the State House or Senate, and was signed into law by Governor Gregoire on 
May 4, 2005. Id. House Bill 1133 did not change the wording of the statute of limitations, but 
this was done through the legislature’s simultaneous passage of House Bill 1758. WASHINGTON 
FINAL BILL REPORT, 2005 REGULAR SESSION, HOUSE BILL 1758, Leg. 59, 1st Sess. (2005) 
[hereinafter Washington Final Report for House Bill 1758]. 
 32. WASHINGTON BILL HISTORY, 2005 REGULAR SESSION, HOUSE BILL 1758, Leg. 59, 
1st Sess. (May 16, 2005) [hereinafter Washington Bill History for House Bill 1758]. This 
amendment was separate and distinct from House Bill 1133, which primarily recodified the old 
Public Disclosure Act. Report for House Bill 1133. House Bill 1758 enacted substantive 
changes, which passed with an overwhelming margin. However, the vote was not unanimous. 
Id.  
 33. House Bill 1758 made a number of changes to the PRA. See Washington Final Report 
for House Bill 1758, supra note 31. These included a new requirement that all government 
agencies appoint an individual responsible for handling all public records request, a new rule 
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new statute of limitations, which replaced the old five-year period 
found in the Public Disclosure Act.
34
 Upon passage, the new 
language read: “Actions under this section must be filed within one 
year of the agency’s claim of exemption or the last production of a 
record on a partial or installment basis.”35 The limitations period 
therefore had two triggering mechanisms: first, an agency’s claim 
that the requested documents were exempted from disclosure; or 
second, when the documents were last produced by the agency on a 
“partial or installment basis.” 
The new language in the statute of limitations is much more 
complex than that originally found in the Public Disclosure Act. 
Fortunately, House Bill 1758’s legislative history offers some 
guidance as to what precisely the legislature meant by this alteration. 
Before being revised, the amendment originally stated, “[Actions 
under this section] must be filed within one year of the agency’s 
claim of exemption or the last production of a record on a rolling 
basis” [emphasis added].36 The Second Substitute Bill later amended 
this language to its final form: “partial or installment basis.”37 
According to the House Bill Report, this was changed in order to 
allow agencies more flexibility in responding to requests.
38
 
Additionally, testimony offered in support of the amendment stated 
that the bill would “reduce litigation, make it easier for people to get 
a record, and make it easier for agencies to follow the PDA.”39  
 
preventing government agencies from denying a request on the basis of its broad scope, and a 
new statute of limitations. See Washington Final Report for House Bill 1758, supra note 31.   
 34. See Washington Final Report for House Bill 1758, supra note 31. The new statute of 
limitations did not supplement, but instead replaced, the old language of the Public Disclosure 
Act. See City of Des Moines, 199 P.3d at 398 (noting that the “provision replaces prior longer 
limitations periods applicable to PRA claims”). This is significant because the new language 
applied to all cases brought under the PRA, and the old statute of limitations was no longer in 
effect.  
 35. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.550.  
 36. WASHINGTON BILL ANALYSIS, 2005 REGULAR SESSION, HOUSE BILL 1758, H. 59, 1st 
Sess. (Feb. 9, 2005).  
 37. WASHINGTON HOUSE BILL REPORT, 2005 REGULAR SESSION, HOUSE BILL 1758, H. 
59, 1st Sess. (Mar. 5, 2005) [hereinafter HOUSE BILL REPORT, HOUSE BILL 1758].  
 38. See id. (“The substitute allows agencies to fulfill requests on a ‘partial or installment’ 
basis as the documents are ‘assembled or made ready,’ instead of on a ‘rolling’ basis as the 
documents ‘become available and ready’”).  
 39. HOUSE BILL REPORT, HOUSE BILL 1758. Although this was not stated by the 
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The House Bill Report contains other subtle clues as to the 
legislature’s intent. The House Bill Report stated that the new 
language imposed “a one year statute of limitations for certain public 
records-related suits” [emphasis added], but this was only mentioned 
in its “brief summary” of the bill.40 The same report stated in its fuller 
summary section that, “Any action involving a person who is denied a 
public record or believes an agency’s time estimate is unreasonable 
must be filed within one year of the agency’s claim of exemption or 
the last production of a record on a partial or installment basis” 
[emphasis added].
41
 While this language is remarkably consistent 
with the actual wording of the statute, it is significant that the section 
specified that the statute would apply to “any action” involving a 
litigant “denied a public record.”42 This conflicts with the idea that 
the statute would apply to only “certain” cases. Similar conflicting 
clues can be found in several other documents discussing House Bill 
1758 prior to its passage.
43
  
The legislature again amended section 42.56.550 in 2011,
44
 
reducing the lower range of per-day penalties imposed on agencies 
for violating the provisions of the PRA.
45
 Although the revision 
suggested the legislature desired to limit agency liability,
46
 the 2011 
 
 40. HOUSE BILL REPORT, HOUSE BILL 1758. The Report was discussing the new 
substitute bill, and language indicating that only “certain” lawsuits were barred by the new 
statute of limitations appeared in its “Brief Summary of Second Substitute Bill” section. Id.  
 41. Id. This language appeared in the “Summary of Substitute Bill” section, under the 
“Judicial Remedies” subheading.  
 42. Id. This is also very similar to the language in the old five-year statute of limitations, 
which applied to “[a]ny action brought under the provisions of this chapter. . . .” WASH. REV. 
CODE § 42.17.410. 
 43. See, e.g., WASHINGTON BILL ANALYSIS, 2005 REGULAR SESSION, HOUSE BILL 1758, 
H. 59, 1st Sess. (February 9, 2005). The wording in these other documents is identical that in 
the House Bill Report.  
 44. WASHINGTON BILL HISTORY, 2012 REGULAR SESSION, HOUSE BILL 1899, Leg. 62, 
2nd Sess. (Oct. 10, 2012). The bill was signed by Governor Gregoire on May 5, 2011, 
becoming effective on July 22, 2011. Id.  
 45. See WASHINGTON FINAL BILL REPORT, 2011 REGULAR SESSION, HOUSE BILL 1899, 
Leg. 62, 1st Sess. (Aug. 22, 2012) (noting that “the lower range of the daily monetary penalty 
that may be assessed by a superior court against an agency for violation of the PRA is revised”). 
The new language reduced the lowest possible daily penalty from $5 to $0, in effect giving 
judges the discretion to award no daily penalty to the government agency in violation of the 
PRA. Id.  
 46. Because the 2011 amendment reduced the lower limit on daily penalties, it provides 
possible evidence of a legislative motive to limit agency liability.  
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amendment made no changes to the wording of the statute of 
limitations.  
In 2009, the Supreme Court of Washington interpreted the new 
statute of limitations for the first time. In Rental Housing Ass’n of 
Puget Sound v. City of Des Moines, the Court focused on the statute’s 
“claim of exemption” triggering mechanism, ultimately concluding 
that the limitations period began to run only when the government 
provided the requester an exemption log.
47
 The Court reasoned that 
statutes of limitation were intended to provide “certainty and 
finality,” which was accomplished through interpreting the “claim of 
exemption” requirement consistently throughout the PRA.48 As the 
exemption issue determined the outcome of the case,
49
 the majority in 
Des Moines did not address the meaning of “the last production of a 
record on a partial or installment basis.”50  
In Tobin v. Worden,
51
 Division 1 of the Washington State Court of 
Appeals became the first appellate court to consider the meaning of 
the statute of limitations’ second triggering mechanism–production of 
records on a partial or installment basis.
52
 In Tobin, the plaintiff had 
made two public records requests via email to the director of King 
County’s Department of Development and Environment Services 
(DDES), requesting copies of an anonymous complaint made against 
her property.
53
 Ms. Tobin and DDES exchanged a number of emails 
 
 47. City of Des Moines, 199 P.3d at 400. The Court held that merely claiming an 
exemption was insufficient, and that the statute “requires identification of a specific exemption 
and an explanation of how it applies to the individual agency record.” Id. at 399–400. The 
requirement that the agency must provide a detailed explanation of the exemption in order to 
trigger the statute of limitations is consistent with the interpretation of other sections of the 
PRA. See supra note 18 and accompanying text..  
 48. “Statutes of limitation serve a valuable purpose by promoting certainty and finality, 
and protecting against stale claims.” City of Des Moines, 199 P.3d at 400.  
 49. Id. at n.3, 401.  
 50. The dissent, however, did address the issue, and stated that a single production of a 
record would in fact trigger the statute of limitations. Id. at 409 (Madsen, J., dissenting). “If the 
agency makes a diligent search for records and produces those that it locates without reference 
to further installments to come, then the agency has fulfilled its duty. If there is no reference to 
installments or forthcoming documents, then the one-year limitation period starts at that point.” 
Id.  
 51. Tobin, 233 P.3d at 906.  
 52. Id. at 908–09. 
 53. Id. at 907. The DDES had begun investigating the Tobins’ property for possible code 
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and letters in the months afterwards, in which DDES failed to turn 
over the requested document.
54
 Ultimately, the Tobins filed suit 
against the County on August 27, 2007.
55
  
Division 1 embraced a strictly literal interpretation of the PRA’s 
statute of limitations. Although it recognized the fact that the 
legislature had shortened the limitations period in 2005 to one year,
56
 
the court looked to what it considered the “plain language of the 
statute.”57 According to Division 1, “a single document that is the 
entirety of the requested record, as was provided here, is not a record 
provided on ‘a partial or installment basis’ within the meaning of the 
PRA because it is not part of a larger set of requested records.”58 The 
Court reasoned that the PRA’s statute of limitations meant precisely 
what it said, and that the legislature would have written the statute 
differently had it intended anything other than the language’s “plain 
meaning.”59 Since the one-year statute of limitations did not apply, 
the plaintiff’s action was not time-barred.60  
Division 2 confronted the issue for the first time in Johnson v. 
State Department of Corrections.
61
 Robert Johnson, the plaintiff, was 
 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 908. In its opinion, Division 1 did not note which date had kick-started the 
statute of limitations, but the opinion relied on the fact that it was well beyond one year. See 
Tobin, 233 P.3d at 908. This fact is of particular significance because of the unexplored 
possibility that RCW 4.16.130’s two-year catch-all statute of limitations could have applied. 
See Bartz, 297 P.3d at 744 n.18 (noting that “it is unclear from the opinion when Tobin received 
the requested documents; so we cannot know whether she filed her complaint within two years 
of receiving the document”).  
 56. Tobin, 233 P.3d at 908.  
 57. Id. Division 1’s interpretation depended heavily upon what they saw as the apparent 
plain meaning of the statute. “When the meaning of statutory language is plain on its face, 
courts must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.” Id.  
 58. Id. at 908–09. The Court looked elsewhere in the PRA to determine whether “partial 
or installment basis” was an ambiguous phrase. Id. at 908. The Court contended that since the 
same phrase was used elsewhere in the PRA, it had a clear and unambiguous meaning. Id. at 
908–09. In order to trigger the statute of limitations, the agency had to either declare an 
exemption or release the requested documents as “part of a larger set of requested records.” Id. 
at 908–09.  
 59. The “statutory language is clear that the one-year statute of limitations is only 
triggered by two specific agency responses—a claim of exemption and the last partial 
production—not simply the agency's ‘last’ response. Id. at 909. “Had the legislature determined 
that the agency's last response would suffice, it would have expressly so stated.” Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Johnson v. State Dep't of Corr., 265 P.3d 216 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011), cert. denied, 277 
P.3d 668 (Wash. 2012). 
















 The Department of Corrections had amended 
its Extended Family Visiting policies in June 2006,
63
 and Mr. 
Johnson made two PRA requests to obtain documentation on these 
changes.
64
 His first request was dated August 21, 2006.
65
 Department 
staff mailed Mr. Johnson a single document in response to this 
request on August 24, 2006.
66
 Mr. Johnson was unsatisfied by this 
response and filed a duplicate PRA request (asking for exactly the 
same documents) less than one month later on September 10, 2006.
67
 
This request was finally resolved almost a year later, on August 27, 
2007, when the Department contacted Mr. Johnson to inform him that 
no additional documents existed.
68
 Thus, the “last production of a 
record” was on August 24, 2006, and only one document was 
produced.
69
 More than two years later, on December 16, 2009, Mr. 
Johnson filed his complaint based on alleged violations of the PRA.
70
  
In Johnson, Division 2 did not reach the decision of whether the 
PRA’s statute of limitations applied to cases involving the production 
of a single record.
71
 The facts of the case, in which Mr. Johnson had 
filed his action more than two years after the agency had produced its 
single installment of records, meant that the court had three options: 
the one-year statute of limitations applied, the two-year “catch-all” 
statute of limitations controlled, or no statute of limitations applied at 
all.
72
 The court declined to choose between the first two options, 
because they held that the action was barred by at least the longer of 
the two (the two-year “catch-all” statute of limitations in section 
 
 62. Id. at 217.  
 63. Id. at 216–17. 
 64. Id. at 217. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. DOC staff wrote Mr. Johnson, explaining that “(1) ‘the only information [the 
DOC] ha[s] is an email documenting approval of the change’; and (2) ‘[the DOC] [is] not 
required to maintain working files.’” Id. A printed copy of the email was sent to Mr. Johnson 
upon receipt of payment. Id.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 218.  
 69. See id. at 217, 219–20. These facts are pivotal to the outcome of the case because they 
determine when the statute of limitations would begin to run.  
 70. Id. at 218. In a motion to show cause dated February 3, 2010, Mr. Johnson claimed 
that the Department had withheld responsive records in contravention of the PRA. Id.  
 71. Id. at 220.  

















 However, the court took pains to distance itself from 
Division 1’s conclusion in Tobin, stating, “in our view, it would be an 
absurd result to contemplate that, in light of two arguably applicable 
statutes of limitations, the legislature intended no time limitation for 
PRA actions involving single-document production.”74  
Division 2 grappled again with the statute of limitations two years 
later in Bartz,
75
 in which another incarcerated felon filed multiple 
PRA requests with the Department of Corrections.
76
 Mr. Bartz later 
filed two complaints based on allegedly inadequate responses by the 
Department in response to his three separate PRA requests.
77
 
Although Division 2 considered issues on appeal relating to both 
complaints, only one involved issues related to the statute of 
limitations.
78
 In response to his second request, Mr. Bartz received all 
of the requested documents from the Department in a single 
installment.
79
 This occurred on January 4, 2010.
80
 He filed his 
complaint in court on March 24, 2011
81—more than one year after 





 73. The court opined that “[n]evertheless, we need not choose whether section 
42.56.550(6)'s one-year statute of limitations or section 4.16.130’s two-year ‘catch-all’ statute 
of limitations applies here because Johnson did not file his action before expiration of even the 
latter, longer period.” Id. at 220.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Bartz v. State Dep't of Corr., 297 P.3d 737 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013), cert. denied, 309 
P.3d 504 (Wash. 2013). 
 76. Id. at 738. Mr. Bartz first requested documents related to inmate personal clothing. Id. 
Next, he requested documents detailing the availability of a variety of medicinal supplements 
he desired to be provided by the Department. Id. at 739. The final request demanded four large 
groups of documents, all related to tort claims filed against the Department. Id. at 739–40.  
 77. Id. at 738. Mr. Bartz claimed that the Department had failed to disclose all responsive 
documents with regard to his three PRA requests. Id. at 741.  
 78. Id. at 741–42. With regard to the first PRA request, the Superior Court had found the 
Department had not violated the PRA. Id. at 742. In Bartz, Division 2 affirmed this finding and 
the dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at 738.  
 79. Id. at 739. The Department sent Mr. Bartz “notice that it had located 66 pages of 
responsive records,” later provided all of the documents in a single installment upon receipt of 
payment. Id.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. Mr. Bartz had filed his first complaint earlier, on January 19, 2011, but waited until 
March 24 to file his complaint related to his second PRA request. Id.  
 82. Id. at 743. Thus, unlike in Johnson, Division 2 was compelled to reach the issue of 
section 42.56.550(6)’s interpretation. Id.  
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Bartz represented a major deviation from Division 1’s 
interpretation of section 42.56.550(6) in Tobin.
83
 In light of the fact 
that the PRA had shortened the statute of limitations from five years 
to one year under the old Public Disclosure Act,
84
 Division 2 held 
that the strict, literalist approach used in Tobin was “absurd.”85 Citing 
its previous decision in Johnson, the court also strongly rejected the 
notion that no statute of limitations whatsoever would attach to an 
agency’s production of a single installment of documents.86 Instead, 
“[t]he legislature intended that the PRA’s one-year statute of 
limitations would apply to PRA requests completed by an agency’s 
single production of records.”87 Because Mr. Bartz had filed his 
second lawsuit more than a year after the Department had produced 
the lone installment of responsive documents,
88
 the court held that his 
case had to be dismissed.
89
  
The Washington State Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the 
split between Tobin and Bartz.
90
 Similarly, Division 3 has remained 
silent, and the legislature has enacted no changes to the language of 
the statute of limitations since the 2011 amendment. All of this means 
 
 83. Division 2 explicitly recognized that Division 1 had already reached the same question 
and arrived at a different result. Id. at 744. However, the Court felt that its own ruling in 
Johnson was controlling precedent: “Rather than following Division One's holding in Tobin, we 
adhere to our reasoning in Johnson.” Id.   
 84. “It would also be absurd to conclude that the legislature intended to create a more 
lenient statute of limitations for one category of PRA requests in light of its 2005 deliberate and 
significant shortening of the time for filing a claim from five years, under the old Public 
Disclosure Act, to one year, under the PRA.” Id. at 743.  
 85. “Although a literal reading of section 42.56.550(6) does not encompass documents 
disclosed in a single production, we need not follow a literal reading of a statute if it would 
yield an absurd result.” Id. at 744. In Bartz, Division 2 cited to State, Dep't of Licensing v. 
Cannon, 50 P.3d 627 (Wash. 2002), in which the Supreme Court of Washington had held that a 
strictly literal approach to statutory interpretation was sometimes inappropriate. Id. In order to 
best serve the purpose and intent of the statute, courts must “avoid a literal reading of a 
provision if it would result in unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences.” Cannon, 50 P.3d at 
636.  
 86. Bartz, 297 P.3d at 743. “[I]t would be an absurd result to conclude that the legislature 
intended no statute of limitations for PRA actions involving the production of a single volume 
of documents.” Id.  
 87. Id. at 744.  
 88. See supra note 81 and 82 and accompanying text. 
 89. Bartz, 297 P.3d at 744.  
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that the proper interpretation of the PRA’s statute of limitations 
remains an open question.  
ANALYSIS 
As Division 2 articulated in Johnson and Bartz, three possible 
answers exist to the question of what limitations period applies in 
cases for which the government agency produces all requested 
documents in a single installment.
91
 The first interpretation would be 
that no limitations period exists and plaintiffs remain free to bring 
PRA claims against government agencies in perpetuity.
92
 The second 
alternative is that only the “catch-all” statute of limitations period 
applies, and lawsuits are barred after two years. Finally, the 
remaining option is that the approach taken by Division 2 in Bartz 
was correct, and section 42.56.550(6) extinguishes PRA cases after 
one year.  
In Tobin, Division 1 selected the first option, primarily on the 
basis of its conclusion that the PRA’s statute of limitations had an 
obvious and evident “plain meaning.”93 According to the court in 
Tobin, since the statute’s literal language did not include agency 




However, the legislative history of section 42.56.550(6) does not 
reveal any plain meaning
95
 on the part of the legislature, nor does it 
 
 91. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.  
 92. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 93. See supra note 59. Tobin is additionally remarkable because Division 1 failed to 
address the possible applicability of section 4.16.130’s two-year catch-all statute of limitations. 
See supra text accompanying note 55. Even if the PRA’s statute does not apply, Division 1 
provided no reason to reject section 4.16.130. This raises the very real possibility that no 
limitations period whatsoever would apply to single-installment cases, leaving government 
agencies liable for alleged violations years (or even decades) old. As Division 2 articulated in 
Johnson, at the very least it would seem that the two-year period should apply. See supra note 
73 and accompanying text.  
 94. See supra note 59.  
 95. “A statute is ambiguous if it can be reasonably interpreted in more than one way.” W. 
Telepage, Inc. v. City of Tacoma Dep't of Fin., 140 Wash. 2d 599, 608, 998 P.2d 884, 890 
(2000) (emphasis in original). See also State v. Keller, 143 Wash. 2d 267, 276, 19 P.3d 1030, 
1035 (2001) (noting that “[a] statute is ambiguous if it can reasonably be interpreted in two or 
more ways”). Additionally, courts must avoid “strained, unlikely, or absurd consequences 
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support a strictly literal interpretation. Firstly, section 42.56.550(6) 
replaced a relatively unambiguous five-year statute of limitations in 
the Public Disclosure Act.
96
 The PRA’s new limitations period is a 
full four years shorter than the old statute, which strongly suggests a 
legislative desire to reduce agency liability.
97
 This move by the 
legislature is inconsistent with dramatically increasing agency 
liability in cases where agencies provided documents in multiple 
installments. Although it could be argued that the more complex 
language in the new statute proves the legislature desired to exclude 
certain cases, it seems highly improbable that the legislature would 
do so without adding another limitations period. If cases involving a 
single production of records really were intended to be outside the 
purview of § 42.56.550(6), it would seem likely that the legislature 
would have provided an alternative limitations period elsewhere.
98
 At 
the very least, this would seem to be a strong argument in favor of 
applying the two-year catch-all provision.  
Moreover, the legislative record provides little evidence 
suggesting a legislative desire to exclude single installment cases. 
Testimony in support of the 2005 amendment (mentioned in the 
House Bill Report) suggested that the new and improved PRA, and 
presumably the statute of limitations, was designed in part to “reduce 
litigation.”99 This goal is clearly at odds with the decision from 
Division 1 that suggested legislative desire to increase agency 
liability in single installment cases.
100
 Moreover, the precise language 
of the statute was altered from “rolling basis” to “partial or 
 
resulting from a literal reading” of statutory language. State v. Neher, 112 Wash. 2d 347, 351, 
771 P.2d 330, 331 (1989). 
 96. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 97. The Supreme Court of Washington strongly hinted at this in City of Des Moines, in 
which it noted that the new provision “replaces prior limitations period.” See City of Des 
Moines, 199 P.3d at 398. Division 2 made this argument in Bartz. See Bartz, 297 P.3d at 743.  
 98. See Johnson, 265 P.3d at 220 n.14 (“[T]here is no other statute of limitations that 
similarly expressly applies to non-partial and non-installment PRA document productions; in 
fact, the legislature has provided no other PRA-specific statutes of limitations at all”).  
 99. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.  
 100. In the old Public Records Act, the legislature made no distinction between single and 
multiple installment cases. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Since one of the goals of 
the 2005 amendment was to reduce agency liability, this does not suggest that the “plain 
meaning” of the statute of limitations was to exclude single installment cases and subject 
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The House Bill Report for House Bill 1758 does note that the 
2005 amendment imposed “a one year statute of limitations for 
certain public records-related suits” [emphasis added].103 Although 
this possibly supports Division 1’s interpretation, the statute includes 
two triggering mechanisms (the other being a claim of an exemption), 
so it is unclear whether the Bill Report’s language is actually 
referring to the “partial or installment basis” phrase.104 More 
importantly, the Report notes later that the new statute of limitations 
would apply to “Any action involving a person who is denied a public 
record” [emphasis added].105 This is contradictory language, because 
the phrase “certain public-records related suits” in the 2005 
amendment is easily juxtaposed with the words “any action” in RCW 
§ 42.17.410 In fact, the word “any” suggests that the legislature 
intended to include single installment cases.
106
 Taken as a whole, 
however, the House Bill Report provides little in the way of hard 
evidence, and it certainly fails to establish a plain meaning on the part 
of the legislature to exclude single installment cases.  
 
 101. See supra note 38. This language was changed specifically in order to provide 
agencies with more flexibility in responding to requests. It does not logically follow that this 
language was imposed in order to subject agencies to more liability if providing documents in a 
single installment, as Tobin suggested.  
 102. In other words, the language cited by Division 1 as demonstrating a “plain meaning” 
to exclude single installment cases was introduced to give agencies more leeway in responding 
to requests, not to punish agencies for providing all of the requested documents as soon as 
possible in a single installment. 
 103. See supra note 40. It also bears repeating that this was only stated in the “Brief 
Summary” section of the House Bill Report. 
 104. Even if the legislature did intend a restrictive interpretation of the statute of 
limitations, the word “certain” does not necessarily mean that single installment cases are meant 
to be excluded. Section 42.56.550(6) has two triggering mechanisms- the other being the 
agency’s last claim of an exemption. Since the limitations period does not begin to run 
beginning with the agency’s first claim (or if the agency fails to properly claim an exemption), 
these cases are not encompassed within the statute and the word “certain” could be read as 
exclusive of those cases. Single installment cases could still be included. Regardless, this 
language is contradicted elsewhere in the House Bill Report. See supra note 42 and 
accompanying text. 
 105. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 106. It is therefore also inconsistent with Division 1’s literal conclusion in Tobin that the 
statute would apply only to cases in which the requested records had been provided in a number 
of installments. Had the legislature intended the statute to cover only some cases, the House Bill 
Report might have used the word “some” in lieu of “any.”  
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The lack of a statewide approach to this issue has obvious 
consequences for the PRA. The current split in the Court of Appeals 
leads to unequal treatment of government agencies across the state 
under the PRA, depending on the jurisdiction in which they reside. 
Agencies located in King County (Division 1), for example, 
potentially face a shorter statute of limitations than similar agencies 
located in Mason County (Division 2). This Court of Appeals split 
leads to an unavoidable amount of ambiguity on the part of 
prospective litigants, as agencies might not be able to adequately 
budget for PRA litigation
107
 when unable to ascertain the length of 
the statute of limitations. As the Washington State Supreme Court 
has not yet settled the issue,
108
 a case brought in the Court of Appeals 
may be overturned on appeal regardless of the division in which suit 





Washington state courts should embrace Division 2’s broad 
interpretation of the PRA’s statute of limitations and apply the two-
year limitations period to cases in which the government agency 
provides the responsive records in a single installment.
110
 When an 
agency produces all of the requested documents in one installment, 
all at one time, the limitations period should commence then. This 
interpretation is consistent with the broad aims of the PRA, is 
beneficial to government agencies, and is in line with the purpose of 
statutes of limitations. Accordingly, Division 2’s holding in Bartz is a 
 
 107. PRA litigation can impose significant costs on government agencies. See supra note 4.  
 108. See supra notes 25 and 90 and accompanying text.  
 109. As the Court of Appeals for Division 3 has not yet adopted either of the Tobin or 
Bartz interpretations, no prospective litigant in Division 3 can confidently predict whether 
section 42.56.550(6) applies to single installment cases.  
 110. Although the proposal in this Note is limited to single installment cases, an additional 
issue exists with regard to the applicability of section 42.56.550(6) to cases in which no 
documents were provided (“no installment” cases). There are valid reasons to argue the statute 
of limitations should apply in those cases. The PRA’s goal is to promote government 
accountability, not to punish government agencies for failing to have the documents requested 
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more reasonable approach to the issue and should be adopted by 
courts statewide.  
There are reasons to adopt a more limited interpretation of the 
statute of limitations. As a whole, the PRA’s goal is to promote 
government accountability through providing individuals access to 
government documents.
111
 This is important to ensure an informed 
electorate. As the PRA mandates that all of its provisions be 
interpreted in order to accomplish this goal,
112
 a limited interpretation 
of section 42.56.550(6) is arguably appropriate, because it benefits 
requestors. Individuals would be able to hold agencies accountable 
for violations of the PRA for an extended (or unlimited) amount of 
time, and this might further the goal of public disclosure. 
Furthermore, an individual would not be barred from bringing a 
claim by a limitations period of which he or she might not have been 
aware.  
However, Division 2’s approach in Bartz is more consistent with 
the aims of the PRA. A government agency’s provision of all 
requested documents in a single installment is preferable to multiple 
installments over a longer period of time because it fulfills the 
request sooner rather than later. This type of expediency should not 
be punished by boundless liability. Agencies should be encouraged to 
provide all requested documents in single installments, but 
interpreting the statute of limitations to exclude such cases would 
actually discourage agencies from doing so. Agencies might provide 
requested documents more slowly, through multiple installments, as a 
means of limiting liability in lawsuits potentially years or decades 
away.
113
 As long as the government agency could defend the decision 
as reasonable, it might hold back documents in order to provide them 
in partial increments, and thereby fall under the protection of section 
42.56.550(6). This would undermine the goal of the PRA to provide 
 
 111. See supra note 3.  
 112. Rental Hous. Ass'n of Puget Sound v. City of Des Moines, 199 P.3d 393, 398 (Wash. 
2009).  
 113. Although the PRA is to be strictly construed against the government agency, this is 
done in order to maximize disclosure. In this case, a strict construction against the government 
agency has the perverse consequence of discouraging disclosure, by incentivizing agencies to 
hold back documents into two installments. For this reason, the strict construction requirement 
does not mandate Division 1’s interpretation.  
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the public with government records, and would represent the kind of 
“absurd result” that courts strive to avoid.114  
Practical considerations also suggest that Washington courts 
should adopt the Bartz interpretation.
115
 Government runs on budgets, 
and no agency has an endless supply of money. Because all 
government agencies in Washington State are potentially liable for 
costly damages under the PRA,
116
 lawsuits can have a tremendous 
effect on their resources. By excluding single installment cases from 
the statute of limitations, agencies face potentially boundless liability 
without any ability to predict legal expenses. Damages from years-
old violations of the PRA could cripple an agency’s ability to 
function,
117
 and agencies that receive a large number of requests for 
documents on a yearly basis would have no knowledge of how many 
lawsuits they might face in the future. Extending the statute of 
limitations to single installment cases would greatly aid agencies in 
anticipating lawsuits and their legal needs, while at the same time 
recognizing the goal of government accountability.  
Finally, statutes of limitations are designed to provide certainty 
and finality to litigation,
118
 a goal that would be undermined by a 
strictly literal interpretation of § 42.56.550(6). An interpretation that 
excludes single installment cases from the statute would produce 
 
 114. As Johnson and Bartz noted, courts strive to avoid an absurd or illogical 
interpretation. See supra note 85. This result would be especially absurd given the PRA’s 
mandate that all of its provisions be interpreted in order to further the goal of public disclosure. 
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
 115. Although any practical considerations must be balanced against the need for 
government accountability, the legislature did so through its adoption of a one-year limitations 
period. In multiple installment cases, the legislature clearly felt that a one-year limitations 
period was adequate to hold agencies accountable for PRA violations.  
 116. Government agencies face the possibility of hefty penalties. Every prevailing litigant 
is entitled as a matter of law to all costs, including legal fees, and the judge has the discretion to 
award up to $100 for each day the agency was in violation of the PRA. WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 42.56.550. To put it into perspective, an agency that unlawfully denied a litigant the right to 
view just one document for 364 days (almost an entire year) could be fined $36,400 even before 
legal fees are accounted for. These potential costs rise for cases extending over two (or even 
more) years.  
 117. The possibility of the PRA harming agencies was well known to the legislature prior 
to the passage of the 2005 amendment. Testimony against the amendment noted that “[t]he 
increased fines in the bill are too high and may give the public incentive to sue agencies. Some 
people currently use the PDA to blackmail agencies.” H.R. 59-1758, 1st Sess. (Wash. 2005).  
 118. City of Des Moines, 199 P.3d at 400. Statutes of limitations are designed in part to 
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unavoidable uncertainty in government agencies, which could 
potentially be sued years later after providing the requested 
documents. Agencies would have no ability to predict how many 
lawsuits they might face or how substantial awards of damages might 
be. Since government agencies must budget for litigation costs, the 
resulting uncertainty could undermine their effectiveness and burden 
taxpayers. This would directly contravene the purpose of statutes of 
limitations, which suggests that the legislature did not intend a 
strictly literal meaning of section 42.56.550(6).  
On balance, the Bartz interpretation is preferable as a public 
policy matter. The goals of the PRA are served by encouraging 
agencies to release the requested documents as soon as possible. A 
broader interpretation is far more favorable, and reasonable, to 
government agencies, which depend on budgets and anticipated costs 
over time. Finally, including single installment cases in section 
42.56.550(6) provides additional certainty and finality to PRA cases, 
remaining consistent with the overall purpose of statutes of 
limitations. For these reasons, courts statewide should follow 
Division 2’s approach.  
CONCLUSION 
The PRA’s statute of limitations should be interpreted as inclusive 
of single installment cases. Division 2’s approach has the advantage 
of providing greater certainty and predictability to government 
agencies as to their own liability, which is the general purpose of all 
statutes of limitations.
119
 Additionally, the legislative history of 
section 42.56.550(6) suggests that the legislature did not intend to 
punish agencies for providing documents in a single installment by 
imposing a longer limitations period.
120
  
Ultimately, the fundamental objective of the Public Records Act is 
to facilitate government accountability by empowering the public.
121
 
This goal must be paramount when interpreting any other provision 
 
 119. Id. at 400 
 120. Similarly, the legislative history does not suggest the legislature intended to punish 
government agencies by imposing no limitations period at all (the outcome suggested by 
Division 1 in Tobin).  
 121. See supra note 3.  
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of the PRA, including the statute of limitations.
122
 This provides the 
single most compelling reason to include single installment cases in 
the PRA’s statute of limitations. The approach chosen by Division 1 
in Tobin encourages agencies to provide requested documents in 
multiple installments, because providing a single installment could 
potentially increase liability.
123
 Instead, Division 2’s interpretation in 
Bartz would not incentivize delayed or multiple installments, but 
rather reward agencies for providing requested documents as soon as 
possible.
124
 Agencies would be motivated to provide documents in a 
single installment, if possible, because it would trigger the limitations 
period. At the same time, this would provide the requester with his or 
her documents in a speedier fashion, and thus fulfill the PRA’s goal 
of maximum disclosure. 
 
 122. See supra note 9.  
 123. See supra note 113  and accompanying text.  
 124. A broader interpretation would incentivize finality in the agency’s response to all 
requests, because as soon as the single installment is provided, the limitations period begins. 
This would allow agencies to better predict potential litigation and give the requester all of the 
documents.  
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